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A THEORY OF DIGITAL DIVIDE: 








This paper attempts to answer the question: How does the income gap between workers 
and capitalists evolve over time in the period of ITC and globalization increasing 
international technology creation and transfers? The model bases on a Romer’s type of 
variety expansion of intermediate goods. We assume that there are two types of agents 
supplying two different types of factors. Workers supply specific skill weighted labor by 
accumulating their specific skills that depreciate with an introduction of new intermediate 
goods. The other type of agents, R&D agents, produce and sell new varieties of intermediate 
goods monopolistically after inventing them. The model yields: Depending on the elasticity 
of substitution between the two factors and on the value of the factor share, an increase in 
the efficiency of technology creation (or lowering the barriers on the imports of intermediate 
goods) affects the growth rates of workers’ and R&D agents’ average income differently. 
First, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, in a certain stage of development, an 
advance in ITC or ‘globalization’ increases the growth rate of R&D agents’ average income, 
while it decreases that of workers’. Thus, the ‘Digital Divide’ happens. Conversely, if the 
elasticity of substitution is less than one, the result will be reversed. These results are 
intuitively obvious. Second, if an economy develops from a higher factor share of the 
workers to a sufficiently lower one, the growth rates of GNP, and the average incomes of 
both workers and R&D agents increase over time. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the globalization, transfers of technology such as ITC happen among various 
different countries more freely. One of the important economic problems related to the 
New Economy is the so-called ‘Digital Divide’. 
In this context, this paper aims to theoretically identify how the income gap between 
workers and capitalists evolve over time in the period of ITC and globalization under 
what conditions. For this, we present a theoretical mechanism describing the dynamic YONG JIN KIM  2 
interactions between workers’ technology adoption and R&D agents’ technology 
creation.
1 
We use a CES production function with two kinds of inputs; specific skills 
accumulated by investing time, and intermediated goods that are made of final goods 
and supplied by monopolistic competitors. Also there are two types of agents; workers 
with specific skills, and R&D agents who invent new kinds of intermediate goods by 
investing their time, also produce and sell them monopolistically.   
An additional assumption is that the more rapid introduction of new intermediate 
goods makes the larger fraction of workers’ specific skills obsolete.
2 Due to this 
mechanism, an exogenous increase in the variety of intermediate goods or opening up of 
the markets of intermediate goods can lower the economy’s growth rate. This can 
happen more frequently when an economy’s production depends more on workers’ 
specific skills than on R&D agents’ creation of new technologies (new intermediate 
goods). It is because if workers’ specific skills exist more dominantly than intermediate 
goods, an exogenous increase in the variety of intermediate goods makes the effect of 
depreciating the dominant factor of specific skills to overshadow that of increasing the 
efficiency of producing intermediate goods, leading to the lower growth rate of income. 
Also the income gap between workers and R&D agents can increase and decrease 
over time depending on the elasticity of substitution and factor shares. We also find that 
depending on the elasticity of substitution and the factor share, an exogenous increase in 
the variety of intermediate goods or lowering the barriers on the imports of intermediate 
goods affects the growth rates of workers’ and R&D agents’ average income differently. 
More specifically, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, in a certain 
stage of development, an advance in ITC or ‘globalization’ increases the growth rate of 
R&D agents’ average income, while it decreases that of workers’. Thus, ‘Digital Divide’ 
happens. Conversely, if the elasticity of substitution is less than one, the result will be 
reversed. Additionally, if an economy develops from a higher factor share of the workers 
to a sufficiently lower one, the growth rates of GNP, workers’ and R&D agents’ average 
income increases over time. 
Several papers provide implications similar to ours. Caselli and Coleman (2000) find 
a negative cross-country correlation between the efficiency of unskilled labor and the 
efficiencies of skilled labor and capital. They interpret this finding as evidence of the 
existence of a World Technology Frontier. On this frontier, increases in the efficiency of 
 
1 Anand and Kanbur (1993) argue that the foremost important factor behind the Kuznets U curve process 
is the shift of population from traditional to modern activities. 
2  It is because a rapid introduction of new intermediate goods, implying a big change in business 
organizations, production systems and technologies, marketing channels, and so forth, depreciates workers’ 
specific skills, lowering their income growth. This represents the mechanism of workers’ adoption of new 
technologies. In other words, to form a different type of specific skills to operate new technologies, a certain 
fraction of the current specific skills will become obsolete.   A THEORY OF DIGITAL DIVIDE  3 
unskilled labor are obtained at the cost of declines in the efficiency of skilled labor and 
capital. The optimal choice of technology depends on the country’s endowment of 
skilled and unskilled labor. And they find that poor countries tend disproportionately to 
be inside the World Technology Frontier. This empirical finding supports our 
assumption stated above. 
Using a specific data set of imports of computer equipment, Caselli and Coleman 
(2001) find strong evidence that computer adoption (imports of computer equipment) is 
associated with higher levels of human capital, and with manufacturing trade openness 
via-a-vis OECD countries. They also find evidence that computers adoption is enhanced 
by high investment rates, good property rights protection, and a small share of 
agriculture in GDP. They use data on imports of computer equipment for a large sample 
of countries between 1978 to 1990, to investigate the determinants of computer- 
technology adoption. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) show that there is a strong complementary effect between 
FDI and human capital: FDI contributes to economic growth only when the host country 
has more than a minimum threshold stock of human capital. Lee (2001), and Caselli and 
Coleman (2001) show that adoption of computer technologies is strongly associated with 
higher levels of human capital. To relate these findings about human capital to the 
results of our model, we can assume that higher level of workers’ human capital 
(education) lowers the depreciation rate of their specific skills with the arrival of new 
technology shocks. It is because human capital will increase agents’ adaptability or 
flexibility. Then, the higher level of human capital agents own, with the higher 
probability new technologies can increase the growth rate of an economy, leading to 
more frequent adoption of new technologies. 
Helpman and Rangel (1999) provides a theoretical model showing that under a wide 
set of circumstances a new technology shock that raises a long-run output can trigger a 
recession in the short run. It is mainly due to the fact that in their model, experienced 
workers’ specific skill depreciates with the advent of a new technology, leading to a 
recession of the economy. This mechanism may explain the slowdown in productivity 
growth in US manufacturing at the beginning of the 20
th century triggered by 
electrification, and the slowdown in productivity growth in the 1970’s possibly triggered 
by computerization. One key aspect that differentiates ours from theirs is that our paper 
formally models the dynamic interactions between technology adoption and creation, 
and the consequent output growth and income distribution. However, they focus only on 
technology adoption, not on technology creation, and the consequent depreciation of 
workers’ specific skills, given an exogenous advent of new technologies.   
The structure of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model of 
the Romer’s type of variety expansion of intermediate goods, and solve the model. 
Section 3 provides interesting implications that can possibly answer the question raised 
above. And Section 4 concludes. 
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2.  THE  MODEL 
 
The model is a variant of the Romer’s model of variety expansion of intermediate 
goods. We assume a continuum of agents having different abilities ( i a ) on [0, 1] and a 
logarithmic preference. Higher abilities enable agents working with R&D firms (R&D 
agents) to make more inventions. There exist two types of agents endowed with one unit 
of time in each period. Workers invest their time to accumulate their specific skills, and 
provide the rest of the time to firms producing final goods at the competitive wage rates. 
We assume that they consume all their wage income and do not save at all to simplify 
the problem. And, the other type of agents are R&D agents who invest a certain fraction 
of their one unit of time to invent new types of intermediate goods, and the rest of the 
time to the labor market for producing intermediate goods. They also produce and sell 
these intermediate goods in monopolistic competitive markets as R&D firm owners. We 
assume that only this type of agents save a constant fraction of their income over time, 
and invest. We will call them as R&D agents in the below. 
We assume that an R&D agent with ability  i ai =  owns  i 2  units of quality 
adjusted time. R&D agents devote a certain amount out of  i 2   units of quality adjusted 
time to produce intermediate goods, and the rest of the time to create new kinds of new 
intermediate goods during each period.
3 Here  A  represents the stock of socially 
accumulated knowledge. Thus, all R&D agents with the level of abilities above a certain 
threshold level (
∗ a ) create new technologies together following 
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where the dot on the variable  A represents the difference operator,  φ  the efficiency 
of creating new kinds of intermediate goods,  R S  the quality-weighted aggregate labor 
input for R&D investment, and k  the aggregate amount of time spent for the 
production of intermediate goods.
4 
Workers with abilities below the certain threshold level (
∗ a ) invest time to 
accumulate specific skills (human capital) and the rest of the time will be supplied to 
labor markets to produce final goods. Here, we assume that an i-th worker with ability 
 
3 We can differently assume this feature that differentiates agents with different abilities from each other 
as: Assume that to join the R&D firms workers should be educated. For this education, workers should pay 
tuitions that decrease in the level of workers’ ability. This different assumption gives identical implications 
with a little bit more complexity. 
4  Here, we regard the expansion of variety of intermediate goods implying various innovations of 
organizations, management systems, products, markets, manufacturing processes, and others. A THEORY OF DIGITAL DIVIDE  5 
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other words, we assume that all workers are identical.
5  
A certain fraction of the worker’s specific skill will become obsolete with the advent 
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where  B  represents the efficiency of accumulating specific skill. This obsolescence 
represents the cost for adopting new specific skills to operate new technologies.
7 
The rest of the time will be supplied to the labor market as 
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The economy’s aggregate production function is described by
8  
 
5 We can assume that more able workers own higher level of specific skills. However, this does not 
change the implications. 
6 This specification of specific skill obsolescence is similar to that in Galor and Moav (2000). And we can 
assume that higher level of workers’ education level, not specific skills, lowers the depreciation rate (δ ) of 
their specific skills with the arrival of new technology shocks. It is because human capital will increase 
agents’ adaptability or flexibility. However, we do not consider an additional variable of worker’s education, 
to focus on our issue. 
7 Lucas (1993), Parente (1994), Parente and Prescott (1994) formally considers the cost of adopting 
technologies in their model. The cost is represented by a constant rate of depreciation of specific skills with 
an adoption of new technologies. 
8 This specification is similar to Acemoglu (2000). This representation implies that the relation between 
specific skill and technology (or skilled labor;  x S ) can be substitutes or complements while relation between 
x S   and technology is on the border line. We can regard  Y   as a composite good derived from two different 
kinds of goods. One type of the labor intensive good is produced from the production function of 
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α β β α  where  x S   is defined as above. However, the BGP equilibrium is hard 
to exist with this formulation, unless  ) (⋅ t s  stays constant, the factor share for each kind of good. This 
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where  t t
a
t t t l h a di i l i h H
∗ = =∫
∗
0 ) ( ) (,   k Sx = , and  ) (i x  represents an i-th intermediate 
good. To produce one unit of these intermediate goods, the firm needs one unit of final 
good. And each R&D firm also monopolistically produces and sells a different kind of 
each intermediate good.   
Utilizing the symmetry among intermediate good inputs, we can also describe the 
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Using (6), we calculate the inverse demand functions for specific skill and 
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the factor share in income for each type of production factors, specific skilled workers 




happens when  γ  is negative. And as  γ  approaches to zero, this function will become the Cobb-Douglas. 
As Caselli and Coleman (2002, 2000) noted, Cobb-Douglas functions can not have different efficiencies for 
different factors. And Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) show that a CES specification fits the cross-country 
data better than a Cobb-Douglas. Specifically, they find that physical capital and human capital adjusted labor 
are more substitutable in the richest group of countries, and are less substitutable in the poorest group of 
countries.  
9 The elasticity of substitution between capital and human capital adjusted labor is 
γ − 1
1 . A THEORY OF DIGITAL DIVIDE  7 
Monopolistic competitive producers of intermediate goods set the price of 
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From (7) and (9), we calculate the total income belonging to each type of agents, 
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Then, (9), (10) and (11) imply that the interest rate will stay constant over time, 
because R&D agents are assumed to save a constant fraction (
r
αβ
) of their aggregate 
income ( Y Z s ) ( ). Also (11) implies that a certain fraction of income of  Y Z s ) ( ) 1 ( α −  
goes to the labor of  k a − −
∗2
1  devoted to producing intermediate goods. Now, 
Appendix B derives how much fraction of the total labor of high ability agents will be 
used for R&D investments and for the production of intermediate goods.   
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Assuming a logarithmic utility preference for all agents, using (2) and the 
assumption of no depreciation of human capital, the first order conditions with respect to 
t u  and  t l  will  be 
 
 
10 For the detailed and standard derivation of this, refer to Appendix A. YONG JIN KIM  8 
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where  t λ  denotes the shadow price of one unit of the endowed time at time  t  in the 
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Using (2) and (4), we obtain 
 
 
11 We can assume that workers’ specific skill increases due to learning by doing, not through education. 
Then, the assumption of a logarithmic preference is not necessary, and the analysis will remain identical, by 
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ρ − = B u B . Here,  ρ  can be any constant, because in this specification, we do not assume anything about 
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(18) implies that level of the aggregate specific skill grows at a rate less than that of 
the individual  k a B δφ δφ δφ ρ + + − −
∗2
, if 
∗ a  decreases. 
Now, we calculate the threshold level of an agent’s ability 
∗ a   assuming an interior 
solution. By utilizing the fact that the income at time t of the marginal agent with the 
ability of 
∗ a  will be identical between the two cases of investing one unit of time in 
accumulating workers’ human capital and in R&D activities. Before going into further 
calculations, to simplify the problem, we further assume that agents believe that the 
income streams grow overtime with a constant growth rate of  g .
12 For this, we first 
calculate the value of one unit of  t H  and  t A  at  time t .  
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Using (19), we derive the value at time  t  that a worker with the ability 
∗ a  can 
obtain by investing one unit of time at time  t  as 
 
 
12 Because we are characterizing an equilibrium of the model including non-BGP equilibria of this model, 
and because agents are quite different from each other in their income streams, without this assumption, the 
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∗ a   can obtain by investing 2
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(21) and (22) imply that the income growth rates of the two types of agents grow at 
different rates, and thus the BGP equilibrium will not exist, unless the factor share in the 
total income of any type of agents remain constant over time. 
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13 The marginal agent’s decision rule is myopic in the sense that she compares virtually only the current 
earning streams of each of the two capital investments in specific skill or that in R&D capital. And we are 
virtually assuming that when R&D agents move to workers’ sector, they are automatically endowed with the 
current level of specific skill through spillover. Now, we will present a different specification of ‘paying 
tuition model’ that yields the same results. This specification assumes that to join the R&D firms workers 
should be educated. For this education, workers should spend a time of 
∗ − a 1 , as the tuition for every point 
in time, that decreases in the level of workers’ ability. We assume further that each R&D agent invents  A φ 2  
number of intermediate goods by investing one unit of time. Then the above specifications of (22) and (23) 
do not change, because their labor supply in the R&D sector will be 
∗ a , after getting education. And the 
growth rates of consumption, income and saving of all R&D agents will be  ) 1 ( 2
∗ − a φ  in this model, 
because (1) will be  ) 2 2 ( ) 1 2 ( 2
1
k a k di S
A
A
a R − − = − = =
∗ ∫ ∗ φ φ φ
&
. A THEORY OF DIGITAL DIVIDE  11 
Lemma 1: An increase in the efficiency (φ ) of R&D investments induces more agents 
to join the R&D sector, leading to the higher growth rate of technology ( A), even less 
able agents will join the group of R&D agents. 
 
(Proof) (23) says that as an increase in the efficiency of creating technologies lowers the 
threshold level of ability (
∗ a ), inducing more labor into R&D investment. Then from (1) 
it is obvious that the growth rate of technology ( A) will increase. 
 
 
3.    IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
 
Before deriving implications from the model, we will explain what we mean by ‘an 




 through rapid advances in ITC or through lowering import barriers on 
foreign intermediate goods. 
(16) with the specifications of (1) and (2) implies the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: An increase in the capital stock of the richer countries with the lower value 
of 
∗ a  (i.e., more labor force in the R&D sector) lowers their level of specific skill 
weighted labor by depreciating the larger fraction of the specific skill. 
 
This lemma can be interpreted as “physical capital and human capital adjusted labor 
are more substitutable in the richest group of countries, and are less substitutable in the 
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14 We are assuming that time proceeds continuously. YONG JIN KIM  12 
Appendix C,
15 we  obtain 
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Before pursuing further implications of the model, note the following lemma, 
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,  the statement is obvious. 
 
Lemma 3 yields the following result of the existence of multiple equilibria. 
 
 
15 For the derivation of 
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Proposition 1: If  γ >0, there exist two long run equilibria and one unstable equilibrium. 




k s a A + − <
∗
φ
,  ) (H st  and 
∗ a  decrease continuously over time to zero, while 




k s a A + − >
∗
φ
,  ) (H st  and 





k s a A + − =
∗
φ
, factor shares, growth rates of GNP, workers’ average income and 
R&D agents’ average income stay constant over time, and the equilibrium is unstable. 








where factor shares, growth rates of GNP, workers’ average income and R&D agents’ 
average income stay constant over time.
16 
 
Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 imply that depending on the elasticity of substitution 
between two factors and on the relative magnitudes of the efficiency of capital 
investment in specific skill and in R&D capital, factor shares or labor force allocation 
increase or decrease continuously over time. It also provides surprising results that even 
though the efficiency of capital investment in specific skill is higher than that in R&D 
capital, if the elasticity of substitution is less than one (as the poorest countries show), 
the factor share and the labor force of the workers’ sector can decrease to the unique 
equilibrium, depending on the initial values of factor shares. And if  γ > 0, an economy 
diverges to one of the two different steady states, only workers’ sector or only R&D 
agents’ sector. However, if  γ < 0, there exist only one stable equilibria of BGP. 
Considering the fact that an exogenous increase in the variety of intermediate goods 
make the larger fraction of workers’ specific skills ( ) (i ht ) obsolete, interesting 
implications follow in the below. In other words, because R&D agents invest their time 
without considering the negative externalities of technology creation on worker’s 
specific skills, market mechanism does not automatically lead to the growth and welfare 
maximization. Thus the next lemma follows. 
 
Lemma 4: Market mechanism does not automatically guarantee the growth and welfare 
maximization. The market mechanism alone leads R&D investments and technological 
progress to excessively depreciate workers’ specific skill. 
 
3.1.    Growth Rate of GNP 





16 The result of Proposition 1 is basically identical to that in Acemoglu (2000). YONG JIN KIM  14 
decrease the growth rate of income, if  ) (H s  or δ  is large enough. More precise 
statement is 
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(Proof) From (25) the first result is obvious. The second result is also obvious from the 
first result and Lemma 3 that 
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 and γ < 0). 
 
This lemma implies that if the obsolescence of specific skill (δ ) is very high, a rapid 
expansion of intermediate input variety can lower the growth rate of income. It is 
because an expansion of intermediate good variety implies various innovations in 
organization, management system, products, markets, and others, which make a large 
fraction of workers’ specific skills obsolete. This in turn lowers the growth rate of 
income. This mechanism is identical to that in Helpman and Rangel (1999). And this can 
more easily happen in an economy where worker’s specific skill is dominant than 
technology creation in the production process.   
Due to the reason similar to that of Lemma 4, advances in ITC or globalization of 
markets of intermediate goods (i.e., removal of barriers on imports of foreign 
intermediate goods) can lower the income growth rate and the welfare of domestic 





17 Different specifications of the model give identical implications. First, if we assume that workers with 
ability ( i a ) must spend a constant fraction of time ( i a − 1 ) in education continuously, and that the ability does 
not affect the efficiency in producing new intermediate goods. Then, this assumption does not affect the 
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where 
∗ n  represents the additional spectrum of new foreign intermediate goods 




(25) yields the following proposition. 
 
Lemma 6: If  y t s H s > ) (  ( y t s H s < ) ( ), then opening up the market of intermediate 
goods will decreases (increases) the growth rate of income. 
 
Lemma 6 yields a surprising result that if one country’s economy depends more on 
worker’s specific skills than technology creation, then opening up the intermediate good 
market can decrease this country’s growth rate. And the higher value of depreciation 
(δ ) of specific skills is, the more likely this happens. In a similar context, Caselli and 
Coleman (2000) find that the optimal choice of technology depends on the country’s 
endowment of skilled and unskilled labor. Also Caselli and Coleman (2001) find that 
computer adoption is enhanced by a small share of agriculture. 
 
3.2.    Growth Rate of Workers’ Average Income 
 






































































instead of  φ . This assumption implies that the stock of current technology also depreciates faster with a 
rapid growth rate of technology level. 
18 We can assume that there exist two identical countries that produce different spectra of intermediate 
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0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 > − − − − α γαβ γ β α , an exogenous increase in 
A
A &
 decreases (increases) 
workers’ average income. And the higher value of depreciation (δ ) of specific skills is, 
the more likely the condition of  w s H s > ) (  holds. 
 
Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 yield the following proposition. 
 




decreases the growth rates of GNP and of workers’ average income. If  w y s H s s < < ) ( , it 
decreases the growth rate of GNP, while it increases that of workers’ average income. 
And if  ) (H s sy > , it decreases the growth rates of GNP and workers’ average income. 
 
(Proof) If  γ < 0, then  w y s s < . Then the results are obvious from Lemmas 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Similarly, we derive the following proposition. 
 




decreases the growth rates of GNP and of workers’ average income. If  y w s H s s < < ) ( , it 
increases the growth rate of GNP, while it decreases that of workers’ average income. 
And if  ) (H s sw > , it decreases the growth rates of GNP and workers’ average income. 
 
(Proof) If  γ > 0, then  y w s s < . Then the results are obvious from Lemmas 5, 6 and 7. 
 
3.3.    Growth Rate of R&D Agents’ Average Income 
 
We can calculate the growth rate of R&D agents’ average income as 
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if  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 > − − − − α γαβ γ β α , an exogenous increase in 
A
A &
 decreases  (increases) 
R&D agents’ average income. 
 
Propositions 2 and 3, and Lemma 8 yield the following propositions. 
 




decreases the growth rates of workers’ and of R&D agents’ average income. If 
R w s H s s < < ) ( , it decreases the growth rate of workers’ average income, while it 
increases that of R&D agents’ average income. And if  ) (H s sw > , it increases the 
growth rates of workers’ and R&D agents’ average income. 
 
(Proof) If γ >0, then  w R s s > . Then the results are obvious from Proposition 2 and 
Lemma 8. 
 
The above case of  R w s H s s < < ) (  with  0 > γ   will show the phenomena of ‘Digital 
Divide’. However, even in this case, the income growth rates of both types of agents will 
increase with respect to an exogenous increase in 
A
A &
  in the long run if 
)) 1 ( ) 1 ( (
) 1 (








, as Lemma 3 shows.   
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Similarly, we derive the following proposition. 
 




decreases the growth rates of workers’ and of R&D agents’ average income. If 
w R s H s s < < ) ( , it increases the growth rate of workers’ average income, while it 
decreases that of R&D agents’ average income. And if  ) (H s sR > , it increases the 
growth rates of workers’ and R&D agents’ average income. 
 
(Proof) If  γ < 0, then  R w s s > . Then the results are also obvious from Proposition 2 and 
Lemma 8. 
 
The above propositions imply the following. First, depending on the elasticity of 
substitution and the factor share, an increase in the efficiency of technology creation or 
in lowering the barriers on the imports of intermediate goods affects the growth rates of 
workers’ and R&D agents’ average income differently. For example, if  γ > 0 (in other 
words, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one), in some region of  ) (H s , an 
advance in information and computer technology or ‘globalization’ increases the growth 
rate of R&D agents’ average income, while it decreases that of workers’. And, if  γ < 0 
(in other words, if the elasticity of substitution is less than one), the result can be 
reversed.
19 Second, if an economy develops from a higher value of  ) (H s  to a 
sufficiently lower value, the growth rates of GNP, workers’ and R&D agents’ average 
income increases over time, as Lemma 3 implies. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper attempts to answer the question: Who gain and lose in the period of ‘New 
Economy’ and the ‘globalization’ that increases the level of international technology 
transfers and spillovers especially? 
The model is basically a Romer’s type of variety expansion of intermediate goods. 
We also assume that there are two types of agents supplying two different types of 
factors. Workers supply specific skill weighted labor by accumulating their specific 
skills that depreciate with an introduction of new intermediate goods. The other type of 
agents, R&D agents, produce and sell new varieties of intermediate goods 
monopolistically after inventing them.   
The model produces the result that an increase in the efficiency of technology 
 
19  The case of  0 > γ  represents richer countries, and that of  0 < γ  poorer countries, following the 
results of Duffy and Papageorgious. A THEORY OF DIGITAL DIVIDE  19 
creation (or lowering the barriers on the imports of intermediate goods) affects the 
growth rates of workers’ and R&D agents’ average income differently, depending on the 
elasticity of substitution between the two factors and on the value of the factor share. 
More specifically, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, in a certain stage of 
development, an advance in ITC or ‘globalization’ increases the growth rate of R&D 
agents’ average income, while it decreases that of workers’. Thus, ‘Digital Divide’ 
happens. Conversely, if the elasticity of substitution is less than one, the result will be 
reversed. Additionally, if an economy develops from a higher factor share of the workers 
to a sufficiently lower one, the growth rates of GNP, workers’ and R&D agents’ average 
income increases over time. 
Even though we can describe the transitory movements more accurately, the main 
implications will not be much different from ours. We can make the model more flexible 
by allowing workers to save, or agents to have more general types of preferences. Also it 
will be very interesting to explore what causes countries to have different values of the 
elasticity of substitution. Finally calibration work can make the model more persuasive. 
 
 
APPENDIX  A  
 
Derivation of the Price of Intermediate Goods 
 
From (8), we can see that final good producers spend a constant fraction of output 
for buying intermediate goods as  t t t t t
t
Y Z s K i x p Y Z s
K
i x p ) ( )) ( ( ) (
1
)) ( ( α α = ⇒ = . Thus, 
given this constraint, we can derive the producer’s demand function for intermediate 
goods by maximizing the following problem. 
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With a Lagrangian multiplier  λ   on the constraint, the FOC with respect to  ) (i x  is 
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APPENDIX  B 
 
Derivation of the Fraction of High Ability Labor for R&D Invention 
 
With the given level of the total labor force of high ability agents, and a constant 
interest rate, we will derive the following marginal conditions that the two wage rates of 
working for production of intermediate goods and for R&D investments should be 
equalized.  
Using (22), the wage rate per one unit of time in the R&D invention sector is 
 
g r
Y Z s A P A w A −
− = =
1
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( α β φ φ .                                   ( B 1 )  
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